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Abstract 
My focus in this paper is on the treatment of the Crown by the courts, especially Canadian courts, 
in judicial review of administrative action. In three areas of administrative law, the Crown has 
been accorded a special status, distinct from that of statutory bodies: administrative powers, 
justiciability and remedies.  
 
In respect of administrative powers, the Crown qua Crown has inherent capacities that are not 
available to statutory bodies. In respect of prerogative powers, the grounds of judicial review are 
restricted. In respect of the remedies that courts may grant, these may be more limited when 
exercises of the prerogative are involved.  
 
In the cases, the special status of the Crown is asserted rather than justified: it is a legal fact is 
search of a normative justification. The absence of a convincing normative justification for the 
special status of the Crown in judicial review of administrative action is significant, because the 
outcome of a case could well turn on whether the power deployed to effect a change in an 
individual’s legal position was exercised by the Crown or by a statutory decision-maker.  
 
My discussion of the three areas leads me to suggest that it should be possible to bring the 
treatment of the Crown into line with that of other administrative decision-makers without creating 
serious jurisprudential difficulties. 
 
Introduction 
The Crown remains a mysterious entity in common law thought. H.R.W. Wade wrote 
that “[t]he legal nature and position of the Crown . . . have been the subject of some 
remarkably contradictory judicial opinions”; although such questions “ought to be very 
familiar and well settled,” “the nearer they come to the bedrock of the constitution, the 
less certain the judges seem to be.”1 F.W. Maitland’s warning that “the crown is a 
convenient cover for ignorance” remains apposite.2 So it is that the Crown has been 
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1 “The Crown, Ministers and Officials: Legal Status and Liability” in Maurice Sunkin & Sebastien Payne 
eds, The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 23 
at 23. 
2 The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908) at 418. See 
further the discussion, below, nn 26-34 of Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada, 2014 FC 651 
[Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care]. 
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described as a “corporation sole,” but also as a “corporation aggregate”3 – and if a 
“corporation” it be, it is one that, by virtue of its imperial history, has many subsidiaries.4  
My focus in this paper is on the treatment of the Crown by the courts, especially 
Canadian courts, in judicial review of administrative action (a term I use interchangeably 
with “administrative law”). As I will demonstrate, through an analysis that will be 
comprehensive if not necessarily exhaustive, in three areas of administrative law, the 
Crown has been accorded a special status, distinct from that of statutory bodies: 
administrative powers, justiciability, and remedies. In respect of administrative powers, 
the Crown qua Crown has inherent capacities that are not available to statutory bodies. In 
respect of prerogative powers, the grounds of judicial review are restricted. In respect of 
the remedies that courts may grant, these may be more limited when exercises of the 
prerogative are involved. 
A particular concern is that the special status of the Crown is asserted rather than 
justified: it is a legal fact in search of a normative justification. It may well be possible to 
justify the royal treatment of the Crown by the courts, perhaps by reference to the 
historical evolution of the Westminster-style constitution or, as a political scientist has 
put it, “a tacit acceptance” by the other branches of government “of the necessity of an 
effective, discretionary executive” that operates unfettered so long as the legislature 
declines to enact statutory provisions encroaching on territory occupied by the executive.5 
But any such justification is absent from the decided cases discussed below and, in any 
event, these justifications go more to the legitimacy of the continued existence of the 
prerogative (with which I do not quarrel) than to the legitimacy of the distinctions that 
have been drawn between the Crown and statutory bodies. The absence of a convincing 
normative justification for the special status of the Crown in judicial review of 
administrative action is significant, because the outcome of a case could well turn on 
whether the power deployed to effect a change in an individual’s legal position was 
exercised by the Crown or by a statutory decision-maker.6 My discussion of the three 
                                                           
3 M v Home Office, [1994] 1 AC 377 (HL) at 424, Lord Woolf: “[The Crown] can be appropriately 
described as a corporation sole or a corporation aggregate”. See also Cheryl Saunders, “The Concept of the 
Crown” (2015) 38:3 Melbourne UL Rev 873. 
4 See variously R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte The Indian 
Association of Alberta and others, [1982] QB 892 (CA); R (Quark Fishing) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
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Independence: The Development of Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
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Canada” (2012) 55:2 Can Public Administration 157 at 158, citing Harvey C Mansfield, Taming the 
Prince: the Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993) 
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comfortable doing so in light of the confusion I referred to at the outset. I appreciate that finer-grained 
distinctions may be possible – for instance, between powers inhering in the Crown and powers conferred 
upon the Crown (or its servants) by statute. But my objective in this paper is not to lay out a taxonomy of 
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areas leads me to suggest that it should be possible to bring the treatment of the Crown 
into line with that of other administrative decision-makers without creating serious 
jurisprudential difficulties.  
Administrative powers 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been very clear that administrative decision-makers 
may exercise only those powers granted by statute. A statutory body “enjoys no inherent 
jurisdiction.”7 The leading case on the powers of administrative decision-makers is ATCO 
Gas & Pipelines Ltd v Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board).8 There Bastarache J. 
explained that “in the area of administrative law” decision-makers obtain their powers 
from only two sources: “(1) express grants of jurisdiction under various statutes (explicit 
powers); and (2) the common law, by application of the doctrine of jurisdiction by 
necessary implication (implicit powers).”9  
Bastarache J.’s reference to the common law is apt to mislead. Implicit powers are not 
free-standing but must be tied to statutory authority. As Lord Shelborne advised, “this 
doctrine ought to be reasonably, and not unreasonably, understood and applied, and that 
whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequential upon, those things that 
the legislature has authorized ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to be held by 
judicial construction, to be ultra vires.”10 Indeed, despite his reference to “the common 
law,” Bastarache J. took a relatively restrictive view of the permissible scope of implied 
powers: “the powers conferred by an enabling statute are construed to include not only 
those expressly granted but also, by implication, all powers which are practically 
necessary for the accomplishment of the object intended to be secured by the statutory 
regime created by the legislature.”11  
Quite how tightly an implied power must be tethered to statute is uncertain. For instance, 
in R (New London College) v Home Secretary,12 Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath took 
different views on this question. For Lord Sumption, the Home Secretary’s authority to 
change her guidance on immigration sponsorship applications by educational institutions 
flowed from her “statutory power . . . to administer the system of immigration control,” 
which “must necessarily extend to a range of ancillary and incidental administrative 
                                                           
Crown powers. It is to demonstrate that the Crown has a special status that is not readily justifiable, 
especially because there are important consequences for individuals depending upon the nature of the 
power used to alter their legal positions.  
7 AG of Que and Keable v AG of Can et al, [1979] 1 SCR 218 at 249.  
8 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 SCR 140 [ATCO]. 
9 Ibid at para 38. 
10 Attorney-General v Great Eastern Railway Co (1880), 5 AC 473 at 478 (HL). 
11 ATCO, supra note 8 at para 51 [emphasis added]. For applications of this principle, see Bell Canada v 
Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] 1 SCR 1722; Chrysler 
Canada Ltd v Canada (Competition Tribunal), [1992] 2 SCR 394; Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd v 
Canadian Air Line Pilots Association, [1993] 3 SCR 724. 
12 [2013] 1 WLR 2358 (UKSC) [New London College]. 
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powers not expressly spelt out. . . .”13 For Lord Carnwath, however, an implicit power 
must be “reasonably incidental” to an express statutory power;14 here, it was an “adjunct” 
to the “the specific function of providing for entry for study.”15 But it is clear that, as far 
as express and implied powers are concerned, a statutory tether is always required. 
Where the Crown is concerned, however, the statutory tether can be cast off.16 Consider 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn of Canada v British Columbia (Attorney General).17 
At issue here was the province’s administration of its “largely non-statutory” Pharmacare 
program.18 In order to cut costs, the province classified different but “therapeutically 
equivalent” prescription medications into “reference categories,” creating baseline prices 
above which patients would not be reimbursed; in exceptional circumstances, physicians 
could also apply for “special authority” to fully compensate Pharmacare patients for 
whom more expensive medication was prescribed.19 There were “no regulations or 
statutory provisions governing the process by which categories of drugs are deemed to be 
therapeutically equivalent, or governing the granting of special authorities.”20 
Newbury J.A. accepted as a general matter “the general power of government to make 
executive decisions regarding the expenditure of public funds to which individual 
members of the public have no enforceable entitlement.”21 In her view, “the Crown has 
the capacities and powers of a natural person.”22 Just as a billionaire could set up a 
Pharmacare scheme and establish criteria for participation, so too could the provincial 
Crown.23 In doing so, the Crown would be subject to the law, in the sense that judicial 
review of the scheme would be available.24 But the existence of judicial oversight did not 
                                                           
13 Ibid at para 28. See also R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain, [1967] 2 QB 864 
(CA) at 886-87 [ex parte Lain]. 
14 New London College, supra note 12 at para 33. 
15 Ibid at para 37. 
16 The point is controversial. See e.g. Bruce Harris, “The ‘Third Source’ of Authority for Government 
Action” (1992) 108 Law Q Rev 626, “The ‘Third Source’ of Authority for Government Action Revisited” 
(2007) 123 Law Q Rev 225, and “Government ‘Third Source’ Action and Common Law 
Constitutionalism” (2010) 126 Law Q Rev 373; John Howell, “What the Crown May Do” (2010) 15:1 
Judicial Rev 36; Lord Lester of Herne Hill & Michael Weait, “The Use of Ministerial Powers without 
Parliamentary Scrutiny: the Ram Doctrine” (2003) Public L 415; Adam Perry, “The Crown’s 
Administrative Powers” (2015) 131 Law Q Rev 652. 
17 (1997), 149 DLR (4th) 613 [Pharmacare]. 
18 Ibid at para 2. 
19 Ibid at para 3. 
20 Ibid at para 4. 
21 Ibid at para 27.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid at paras 27-28. See also Attorney General of Quebec v Labrecque, [1980] SCR 1057 at 1082, Beetz 
J:  
The Crown is also the Sovereign, a physical person who, in addition to the prerogative, enjoys a 
general capacity to contract in accordance with the rule of ordinary law. This general capacity to 
contract, like the prerogative, is also one of the attributes of the Crown in right of a province.  
24 See also McDonald v Anishinabek Police Service (2006), 83 OR (3d) 132 (CA). 
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affect the “Crown's ability to establish Pharmacare in the first place or to restrict it by 
means of reference-based pricing in the second place.”25 
More recently, in Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada,26 the Federal Court held 
that cuts to refugee healthcare were “cruel and unusual” treatment that violated the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.27 On a preliminary point, Mactavish J. concluded that 
the funding and consequently the defunding of the healthcare programme for refugees 
was intra vires the federal executive. No statutory authorization was necessary to support 
the programme given the broad executive authority accorded to the federal executive 
under the Canadian constitution. Mactavish J. did not clearly identify the source of the 
power to fund refugee healthcare. She cited Peter Hogg: “[s]ometimes, the term 
‘prerogative’ is used loosely, in a wider sense, as encompassing all the powers of the 
Crown that flow from the common law . . . [but] [n]othing practical now turns on the 
distinction between the Crown’s ‘true prerogative’ powers and the Crown’s natural-
person powers, because the exercise of both kinds of powers is reviewable by the 
Courts.”28 And she seemingly agreed that any potential distinction was unnecessary in 
this case, because in the absence of clear statutory language, “the Crown’s prerogative 
power to spend in an area not addressed by statute remains intact. . . .”29  
Given the broad scope of the Crown’s authority to act as a natural person, it was simply 
unnecessary to determine whether the refugee healthcare scheme was enacted by virtue of 
the prerogative or of the Crown’s other common-law powers. This conclusion might, 
however, be criticized. Prerogative powers follow the constitutional division of powers 
between the federal government and the provinces.30 However, “health” “is not an 
enumerated head” of federal or provincial competence,31 “but instead is an amorphous 
topic which can be addressed by valid federal or provincial legislation, depending in the 
circumstances of each case on the nature or scope of the health problem in question.”32 
Although the federal government’s exercises of its spending power and its criminal-law 
competence have permitted it to exercise a great deal of authority in relation to 
healthcare, “health” is not a federal competence and, in general, matters of healthcare 
provision fall more naturally under the broad provincial competences in respect of 
hospitals, property and civil rights, and local matters.33 It might even be argued that the 
                                                           
25Pharmacare, supra note 17 at para 30. 
26 2014 FC 651. 
27 Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982 (UK), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 
12: “Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”.  
28 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care, supra note 2 at para 392, citing Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of 
Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf) at 1-19. 
29 Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care, supra note 2 at para 401. 
30 Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company v The King, [1916] 1 AC 566 (PC) at 580. 
31 RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 32, LaForest J, dissenting, 
but not on this point. 
32 Schneider v The Queen, [1982] 2 SCR 112 at 142, Estey J. 
33 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 92(7), (13), (14), reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5. 
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prerogative to establish ex gratia healthcare schemes is a provincial competence, which 
would render the refugee healthcare scheme ultra vires the federal government. There is, 
of course, a plausible counter-argument to the effect that a refugee healthcare scheme 
flows from the federal government’s authority over immigration.34 Nonetheless, this 
constitutional issue only arises if the power is prerogative in nature. If the scheme could 
be established pursuant to another common-law power, then there would surely be no 
division-of-powers problem, because the attribution of the “capacities and powers of a 
natural person” to the federal or a provincial Crown could not be inhibited by the 
constitutional division of powers. The point is that the distinction could matter and, 
indeed, may matter more in a different case; Mactavish J.’s ability to glide over the 
distinction reinforces my observation at the outset that confusion reigns in respect of the 
Crown.  
Despite this quibble, it is clear that the Crown in Canada benefits from some inherent 
powers that are not granted by statute and that do not necessarily reside in the royal 
prerogative. It has the capacities of a natural person and, as such, can do those things that 
a natural person can do. In an incisive recent essay, Adam Perry has cast serious doubt on 
whether the legal principles just summarized are coherent; in particular, he argues, courts 
and commentators have tended to conflate permissions (the absence of prohibitions on 
action) and powers (the ability – including the authority conferred by law – to do 
something).35 In any event, such latitude is not afforded to administrative decision-
makers. As statutory bodies, they have no inherent capacities and possess only those 
powers expressly or implicitly conferred by statute.  
The stakes of the debate about inherent powers were well explained by Carnwath L.J. in 
Shrewsbury & Atcham Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities & Local 
Government.36 The discussion there focused on the powers of the Crown, rather than 
those of statutory bodies, but provides a useful entrance point to the discussion. Carnwath 
L.J. took the view that “the powers of the Secretary of State are not confined to those 
conferred by statute or prerogative, but extend, subject to any relevant statutory or public 
law constraints, and to the competing rights of other parties, to anything which could be 
done by a natural person.”37 He relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v 
Secretary of State for Health ex parte C,38 where the respondent’s power to maintain a 
non-statutory list of sex offenders was upheld. But he was critical of this decision. In his 
view, any category of so-called inherent powers “is exceptional, and should be strictly 
confined”: “As a matter of capacity, no doubt, [the Crown] has power to do whatever a 
private person can do. But as an organ of government, it can only exercise those powers 
for the public benefit, and for identifiably ‘governmental’ purposes within limits set by 
                                                           
34 Ibid, s 91(25). 
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37 Ibid at para 44.  
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the law.”39 Although Carnwath L.J. was concerned there with the Crown and not a 
statutory body, similar concerns arise in the latter case. On the one hand, to operate 
effectively statutory bodies must be able to use a wide variety of powers that have not 
specifically been granted to them. On the other hand, any such additional powers cannot 
be unlimited; more to the point, unless they are expressly granted or necessarily implicit 
in specific statutory grants of authority, they cannot be used to “coercive” effect40 (that is, 
to modify the legal position of a subject against her will), can only be used to support the 
attainment of statutory objectives and their exercise must otherwise respect the law. 
There is no doubt that this is “a difficult question with far-reaching constitutional 
implications,”41 but in my view there is at least an argument for extending the same 
judicial generosity for inherent Crown powers to administrative decision-makers more 
generally. Take as a starting point a choice between two different ways of recognizing the 
powers of statutory decision-makers. One may say that all government action (including 
powers to contract, manage property and so on) must be expressly or impliedly 
authorized by statute in which case, on the conventional view, only those powers 
expressly granted by or implicit in a statutory scheme can be used to coercive effect. This 
is the conventional view laid out by Bastarache J. in the ATCO case. Alternatively, one 
may say that there are three categories of authority: express, implicit, and inherent, the 
last of which cannot be used to coercive effect.  
On its face, option one may seem more attractive because it limits the powers that 
statutory bodies can claim, whereas option two seems to give them an additional category 
of powers. Probing further, however, casts doubt on the prima facie appeal of option one. 
The key question is the identification of implied powers. Does the test for an implied 
power require that the power should be necessary to give effect to express statutory 
provisions, or simply that it should be reasonably incidental to the express provisions?  
Those who choose option one might prefer a test of necessity to a test of reasonableness 
because it makes coercive action harder to justify by limiting the range of powers that 
may be used coercively. But if one takes option one and insists that coercive action must 
be expressly or implicitly authorized, one will often have to strain to imply a power to 
carry out a wide range of activities not expressly provided for in statute. As long as “[t]he 
complex process of government includes a vast amount of work in relation to the 
formulation of policy, drafting new legislation and preparing for its implementation,”42 
judges responding to the felt necessities of administration can be expected to try to 
accommodate the practical needs of government, including the recognition of powers to 
contract and manage property. For this reason, the introduction of “any limiting 
principle” designed to cabin administrative powers would risk being “so wide as to be of 
                                                           
39 Shrewsbury & Atcham Borough Council, supra note 36 at paras 47-48. 
40 New London College, supra note 12 at para 28.  
41 R (Hooper) v Secretary of State, [2005] 1 WLR 1168 (HL) at para 6, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
42 Shrewsbury & Atcham Borough Council, supra note 36 at para 73, Richards LJ. 
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no practical utility or would risk imposing an artificial and inappropriate restriction upon 
the work of government.”43 Put simply, one who chooses option one will find herself 
drawn in practice to a test of reasonably incidental rather than necessary. If the test for 
implied powers is that they merely be reasonably incidental, a great deal of coercive 
action becomes possible.44 Casting the net of implied powers wide will legitimate a broad 
range of governmental action that infringes individuals’ rights and interests. By contrast, 
a test of necessity would constrain coercive government action.  
Rather than straining to shoehorn the many varieties of administrative action into the 
categories of express and implied powers, judges and jurists would be better to recognize 
that there are express powers, accompanied by powers necessarily implicit in the 
statutory scheme, and also a residue of inherent powers reasonably incidental to statutory 
functions, which can be used to write contracts, hire staff, issue guidelines and so on; in 
short, to enable those bodies to fulfil their statutory objectives more effectively.45 But 
where a statutory body wishes to change an individual’s legal position without her 
consent, the power employed would have to be express or necessarily implicit.46 
                                                           
43 Ibid at para 74, Richards LJ. 
44 The situation may become even more grave when there is general legislation (such as, for instance, 
section 7 of the Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11) that grants administrative powers in 
broad terms, for any coercive action might (in principle) be authorized by virtue of being reasonably 
incidental to a broad grant of authority; a very wide range of coercive action would thus be justified 
(although the drafter of the Financial Administration Act might well have doubted this, for section 7.2(5) 
provides that the Treasury Board has “the capacity of a natural person,” thereby suggesting that the body’s 
inherent powers spring from a different source than the general sources provided for in broad terms in 
section 7). A more restrictive necessity standard would limit the range of powers that could be used by 
reference to broad grants of authority; additional powers would be recognised as inherent, on my approach, 
exercisable only in a non-coercive fashion. There would undoubtedly be difficult be difficult questions of 
interpretation in situations where broad statutory powers and inherent statutory powers co-existed (though 
in the case of the Financial Administration Act, a distinction has apparently been made in those terms by 
the drafter): see also Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr (No 2), 2010 SCC 3 at para 35, [2010] 1 SCR 44, 
discussed in Lagassé, supra note 5 at 166 [Khadr (No 2)]. 
45 This analysis differs slightly from Adam Perry’s analysis of the Crown’s administrative powers. Perry 
argues persuasively that certain powers of the Crown exist by virtue of community acceptance: 
“Ultimately, the Crown’s non-legal powers derive from our willingness as a community to attribute 
ordinary acts to the Crown”: Perry, “Administrative Powers”, supra note 35 at 663. It is doubtful, however, 
that community acceptance would justify the attribution to statutory bodies of inherent powers that go 
beyond those reasonably incidental to the achievement of statutory objectives. Indeed, in his discussion of 
the Crown’s administrative powers, Perry leaves open the possibility that these too may legitimately be 
restricted to those that serve identifiably governmental purposes: “it might be thought that the Crown is 
capable only of acting in ways that promote governmental purpose” (ibid at 667, fn 73). See also 
Shrewsbury & Atcham Borough Council, supra note 36 I tend to agree with Perry on this point. The 
imposition of such a limit would do much to put statutory bodies and the Crown on a similar footing as far 
as the extent of their respective inherent powers is concerned.  
46 There may, in addition, be some rights and interests that can only be interfered with where there is 
express statutory authority to do so, as per the ‘clear statement’ rule: R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Pierson, [1998] AC 539 (HL).  
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The New London College case juxtaposes options one and two quite nicely. Lord 
Carnwath went with option one and, predictably, a test of reasonably incidental.47 He tied 
the issuing of mandatory guidance as to the criteria for becoming a sponsor to a specific 
provision in the Immigration Act, 1971; it was an “adjunct” to the statutory power to 
regulate admissions for the purposes of study.48 Perhaps notably, Lord Carnwath’s 
reliance on a test of reasonableness allowed him to imply a power to revoke any licences 
granted;49 a more robust test of necessity might have required an express power to grant 
and revoke given the obvious detriment caused by revoking licences. 
By contrast, Lord Sumption was more adventurous. For him, the issuing of guidelines 
could be understood as flowing from the Home Secretary’s general power under the 
legislation: “the statutory power of the Secretary of State to administer the system of 
immigration control must necessarily extend to a range of ancillary and incidental 
administrative powers not expressly spelt out in the Act, including the vetting of 
sponsors.”50 Subject to a caveat I will discuss momentarily, this is in line with option two. 
The Home Secretary has inherent powers, just as an “Educational Institutions 
Immigration Agency” or some similar creature of Parliament would have inherent 
powers. Beyond those powers that are express or implied, there are other ancillary 
powers available to the Home Secretary in the discharge of her statutory functions, as 
long as these powers are reasonably incidental to the attainment of statutory objectives. 
Quite properly, however, the last category of powers is not “unlimited”51: 
The Secretary of State cannot adopt measures for identifying suitable sponsors 
which are inconsistent with the Act or the Immigration Rules. Without specific 
statutory authority, she cannot adopt measures which are coercive; or which 
infringe the legal rights of others (including their rights under the Human Rights 
Convention); or which are irrational or unfair or otherwise conflict with the 
general constraints on administrative action imposed by public law.52  
One can argue that Lord Sumption dismisses too quickly the possibility that the scheme 
at issue was coercive (especially given the ability to revoke licences) but he at least had 
to demonstrate that the scheme was not coercive, something Lord Carnwath did not have 
to do because under option one coercion is justifiable once a power has been implied.  
Here is my caveat: the prevailing view in England and Wales is that the “third source” of 
inherent powers lies in the nature of the Crown as a corporation,53 but if so, third source 
powers exercisable by ministers spring from the general existence of the Crown, and the 
1971 Act, on which Lord Sumption relied, is entirely irrelevant unless proposed exercises 
                                                           
47 New London College, supra note 12 at para 33. 
48 Ibid at para 37. 
49 Ibid at para 38. 
50 Ibid at para 28. 
51 Ibid at para 29. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ex parte C, supra note 38 at 476. 
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of third source powers are inconsistent with it. Lord Sumption’s analysis has been 
described as “muddled” for this reason,54 but it would presumably not be so muddled if 
the respondent had been a statutory body rather than one of Her Majesty’s ministers.  
The alternative view that I have been detailing is that all government entities created by 
statute might enjoy a category of power which is neither express nor implied. Inherent 
powers, on this reading, spring from the creation of an administrative body and the 
vesting of statutory authority in it. There are express powers, necessarily implicit powers, 
and inherent powers that are reasonably incidental to the attainment of statutory 
objectives. Only express and implicit powers could be used for coercive purposes, 
inherent powers could not be. Making this doctrinal leap55 would reduce the range of 
powers official bodies could use in a coercive manner. In addition, it would ensure a 
significant degree of consistency56 in the treatment of Crown powers and those of 
statutory bodies. 
Justiciability: judicial review of the prerogative 
Nowadays, it is trite law that the exercise of the royal prerogative is subject to judicial 
oversight.57 To begin with, the existence and scope of prerogative powers are determined 
by the courts.58 And more generally the exercise of those powers is subject to judicial 
review on the ordinary grounds. To the extent that judicial review is unavailable of 
certain types of executive action it is because of their “nature,” not their “source”:59 
“Some questions are so political that courts are incapable or unsuited to deal with them, 
or should not deal with them in light of the time-honoured demarcation of powers 
between the courts and the other branches of government.”60 
Yet, on closer inspection, the grounds of judicial review of the exercise of a prerogative 
power prove to be narrower than they are in respect of a statutory power. For instance, 
there is “a duty of procedural fairness lying on every public authority making an 
administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature and which affects the rights, 
                                                           
54 Mark Elliott, “Muddled thinking in the Supreme Court on the “third source” of governmental authority” 
(23 July 2013), Public Law for Everyone (blog), online: 
<www.publiclawforeveryone.com/2013/07/23/muddled-thinking-in-the-supreme-court-on-the-third-
source-of-governmental-authority/> 
55 I fully recognize that doing so would require a long line of authorities to be at least revisited.  
56 The prevailing view that the Crown has the capacities of a natural person suggests that the Crown’s 
powers would remain wider than those of statutory bodies, but the prevailing view has been criticized and, 
as noted in note 45 above, the Crown’s powers could well be limited to those powers that serve identifiable 
governmental objectives, in which case the inherent powers of the Crown and of statutory bodies would be 
treated very similarly. 
57 See also, as to other common law powers, ex parte Lain, supra note 13 at 888, Diplock LJ. 
58 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, [1920] AC 508 (HL). 
59 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC 374, at 417, Lord Roskill 
[Council of Civil Service Unions].  
60 Hupacasath First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada), 2015 FCA 4 at 
para 62, Stratas JA. See Andrew Banfield & Greg Flynn, “Activism or Democracy? Judicial Review of 
Prerogative Powers and Executive Action” (2015), 68:1 Parliamentary Affairs 135 [Banfield & Flynn]. 
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privileges or interests of an individual.”61 The old distinction between reviewable 
decisions affecting rights and unreviewable decisions affecting mere privileges62 has been 
banished from most areas of administrative law. But not from the review of prerogative 
powers. 
The leading Canadian case remains the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Black 
v Canada (Prime Minister).63 Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien had long been at 
loggerheads with Conrad Black, whose newspapers had been critical of Chrétien. 
Chrétien advised the British government not to bestow honours upon Black, who 
commenced claims against Canada and the Prime Minister, to which the defendants 
invoked the non-justiciability of prerogative powers. Laskin J.A. accepted that making 
recommendations about honours was an aspect of the prerogative, which extended to 
“giving advice on, even advising against, a foreign country's conferral of an honour on a 
Canadian citizen”,64 a power properly exercisable by the Prime Minister.65 But he went 
on to hold that judicial review of prerogative powers is limited: “the exercise of the 
prerogative will be justiciable, or amenable to the judicial process, if its subject matter 
affects the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual.”66 No rights or legitimate 
expectations were engaged by the exercise of the honours prerogative: 
The refusal to grant an honour is far removed from the refusal to grant a passport 
or a pardon, where important individual interests are at stake. Unlike the refusal of 
a peerage, the refusal of a passport or a pardon has real adverse consequences for 
the person affected. Here, no important individual interests are at stake. Mr. 
Black's rights were not affected, however broadly "rights" are construed. No 
Canadian citizen has a right to an honour. . . . The receipt of an honour lies 
entirely within the discretion of the conferring body. The conferral of the honour 
at issue in this case, a British peerage, is a discretionary favour bestowed by the 
Queen. It engages no liberty, no property, no economic interests. It enjoys no 
procedural protection. It does not have a sufficient legal component to warrant the 
court's intervention.67 
The distinction between rights and privileges again featured prominently in a more recent 
case involving Lord (by then) Black’s membership of the Order of Canada: Black v 
Advisory Council for the Order of Canada.68 Lord Black was convicted of criminal 
offences in the United States arising out of his stewardship of Hollinger International. He 
had previously been appointed to the Order of Canada, but his criminal convictions 
                                                           
61 Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643 at para 14, Le Dain J [emphasis added]. 
62 R v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Company, [1924] 1 KB 171 
(CA) at 205.  
63 (2001), 54 OR (3d) 215 (ONCA).  
64 Ibid at para 37. 
65 Ibid at para 38. 
66 Ibid at para 51. 
67 Ibid at paras 60-62. 
68 2012 FC 1234, affirmed 2013 FCA 267 [Black No (2)]. 
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jeopardized his continuing membership. Members of the Order of Canada are appointed 
by the Governor-General on the advice of an Advisory Council. Its procedures are 
regulated by its Constitution and a “Policy and Procedure for Termination of 
Appointment to the Order of Canada.” Pursuant to section 3 of the Policy, termination of 
membership will be considered in certain circumstances.69 According to the policy, any 
termination decision must be made fairly and based on all relevant evidence after having 
ascertained the facts. Provision is also made in the policy for representations to be made 
by individuals who have been notified that their membership may be terminated.  
The crux of the present case was that Lord Black wanted the opportunity to address the 
Advisory Council in person, and not simply in writing. Clearly, Lord Black was going to 
be allowed to make representations. The only question was whether he would be confined 
to the written word. The first hurdle that Lord Black had to overcome was that presented 
by his previous case. de Montigny J. accepted the government’s argument that Lord 
Black did not have a right which was subject to judicial review: 
I fail to see how a person on whom an honour has been bestowed would have any 
greater right or expectation of keeping it than a person has of receiving it in the 
first place . . . . The mere fact that a privilege has been conferred, however, absent 
other external circumstances, does not transform that privilege into a right 
enforceable in court. Once it is recognized that an honour is granted at the 
discretion of the Crown and that no one is “entitled” to such an honour, the same 
must be true of the decision to withdraw it afterwards. That a person may feel his 
or her reputation will be tarnished by the loss of an honour is no more significant, 
from a legal perspective, than a person who feels aggrieved by the fact that he or 
she has not been recognized to be worthy of an honour in the first place. In both 
instances, the decision is discretionary and highly subjective, based on 
considerations that have little to do with ascertainable and objective (let alone 
legal) norms, and for that reason is ill-suited for judicial resolution.70 
This reasoning nicely illustrates why the distinction between rights and privileges is 
unworkable. To begin with, there is surely a difference between not receiving an honour 
– when others might simply think that you had been “passed over” – and being stripped 
of one – where there can be no doubt that you have been reprimanded. Once an honour 
has been conferred, it must surely lose its character as a “privilege” and become a “right.” 
Where before it was a mere possibility, now it has vested, and can only be lost in a very 
                                                           
69 Where:   
(a) the person has been convicted of a criminal offence; or 
(b) the conduct of the person 
(i) constitutes a significant departure from generally-recognized standards of public 
behaviour which is seen to undermine the credibility, integrity or relevance of the Order, 
or detracts from the original grounds upon which the appointment was based; or 
(ii) has been subject to official sanction, such as a fine or a reprimand, by an adjudicating 
body, professional association or other organization. 
70 Black (No 2), supra note 68 at para 51. 
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public and humiliating fashion. To borrow from Justice Holmes: even Lord Black can 
distinguish between being stumbled over and being kicked.71  
Furthermore, the Order of Canada is an aspect of the prerogative to grant honours, but 
attached to the Letters Patent creating it is a long and detailed Constitution. Determining 
lawfulness then becomes more a question of interpretation than a question of pure 
policy.72 Indeed, de Montigny J. effectively recognized this. Despite his earlier finding 
that membership in the Order of Canada was a privilege and not a right, he held that Lord 
Black had a legitimate procedural expectation that he would be allowed to make 
representations, based on the Policy. This was enough to overcome the justiciability 
obstacle: “I fail to see how it can be argued that it does not create an expectation that it 
will be adhered to, or that the steps it prescribes do not provide an objective basis on 
which courts may be called upon to determine whether the Council has exercised the role 
assigned to it and followed the procedure according to which it is to fulfill its mandate.”73 
Unfortunately for Lord Black, de Montigny J. concluded that an oral hearing was not 
necessary “to ensure that his arguments are dealt with fairly”; written submissions would 
give him “ample opportunity to present his side of the story.”74 More generally, it is 
incongruous to adhere for the most part to the distinction between rights and privileges 
but to permit judicial intervention where a legitimate expectation has been established, 
which will typically turn on the essentially semantic issue of whether there has been a 
“clear, unambiguous and unqualified” statement about the procedure the decision-maker 
will follow.75 
Even though judicial review of prerogative powers is nominally on the same footing as 
judicial review of statutory powers, the distinction between rights and privileges 
continues to play an important – and unhelpful – role in the review of prerogative 
powers.76  
Special judicial treatment for prerogative powers is not a uniquely Canadian 
phenomenon. Consider R (Sandiford) v Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.77 A 
British citizen accused by the Indonesian authorities of drug trafficking, an offence that 
                                                           
71 The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1881) at 3.  
72 See similarly Chaisson v Canada (2003), 226 DLR (4th) 351 at para 16, Strayer JA: 
It is, in my view, arguable that the royal prerogative having been used to create a body (the 
Canadian Decorations Advisory Committee) to perform a screening function prior to the exercise 
by the Governor General of her discretion in the grant of honours, that body is bound by the 
Regulations creating it and its activities may be subject to judicial review. . . . Even if the 
Committee's ultimate opinion given to the Governor-General under paragraph 8(e) of the 
Regulations, and the Governor-General's ultimate choices, are not judicially reviewable, this 
should not necessarily preclude the Court from reviewing the procedure and criteria followed by 
the Committee to see if they comply with the Regulations. 
73 Black (No 2), supra note 68 at para 63. 
74 Ibid at para 85. 
75 Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 at para 68, [2011] 2 SCR 504.  
76 See also Drabinsky v Advisory Council of the Order of Canada, 2014 FC 21, aff’d 2015 FCA 5. 
77 [2013] EWCA Civ 581, aff’d [2014] UKSC 44 [Sandiford]. 
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carries the death penalty in that jurisdiction, wanted the British government to fund her 
defence. Pursuant to the foreign affairs prerogative, the Foreign Secretary has developed 
a policy, outlined in a pamphlet entitled Support for British Nationals Abroad: a Guide. It 
contains the following passage: 
Although we cannot give legal advice, start legal proceedings, or investigate a 
crime, we can offer basic information about the local legal system, including 
whether a legal aid scheme is available. We can give you a list of local 
interpreters and local lawyers if you want, although we cannot pay for either.78 
In line with the published policy, the respondent refused to defray the applicant’s legal 
expenses. 
The question for the courts was whether the published policy fettered the discretion of the 
minister. At the Court of Appeal, Lord Dyson M.R. concluded that, in matters 
prerogative, the rule against fettering discretion79 does not apply.80 As a previous bench 
of the Court of Appeal had put it in R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence, “it is 
within the power of the decision-maker to decide on the extent to which the power is to 
be exercised in, for example, setting up a scheme. He can decide on broad and clear 
criteria and either that there are no exceptions to the criteria in the scheme or, if there are 
exceptions in the scheme, what they should be.”81 Lord Dyson M.R.’s analysis was 
endorsed on appeal.82 Lord Carnwath and Lord Mance put the point this way: 
[P]rerogative powers have to be approached on a different basis from statutory 
powers. There is no necessary implication, from their mere existence, that the 
State as their holder must keep open the possibility of their exercise in more than 
one sense. There is no necessary implication that a blanket policy is inappropriate, 
or that there must always be room for exceptions, when a policy is formulated for 
the exercise of a prerogative power.83 
                                                           
78 [Emphasis added]. 
79 British Oxygen Co Ltd v Board of Trade, [1971] AC 610 (HL) [British Oxygen]. 
80 [2013] EWCA Civ 581 at paras 53-54. 
81 [2006] 1 WLR 3213 at para 191 (CA). 
82 Sandiford, supra note 77. 
83 Ibid at para 62. See also Lord Sumption at para 83: 
A common law power is a mere power. It does not confer a discretion in the same sense that a 
statutory power confers a discretion. A statutory discretionary power carries with it a duty to 
exercise the discretion one way or the other and in doing so to take account of all relevant matters 
having regard to its scope. Ministers have common law powers to do many things, and if they 
choose to exercise such a power they must do so in accordance with ordinary public law 
principles, ie fairly, rationally and on a correct appreciation of the law. But there is no duty to 
exercise the power at all. There is no identifiable class of potential beneficiaries of the common 
law powers of the Crown in general, other than the public at large. There are no legal criteria 
analogous to those to be derived from an empowering Act, by which the decision whether to 
exercise a common law power or not can be assessed. It is up to ministers to decide whether to 
exercise them, and if so to what extent. It follows that the mere existence of a common law power 
to do something cannot give rise to any right to be considered, on the part of someone who might 
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The Court was unanimous in rejecting the application, finding that no legitimate 
expectation had been established or irrationality demonstrated. 
Does this distinction between statutory discretion and prerogative make sense? The 
distinction is formal and it is underpinned by logic: largesse under the prerogative is 
entirely in the gift of the executive, something that cannot be said of largesse provided for 
by statute. In the latter case, the executive cannot ignore the statutory context in 
exercising its powers.84 In the former case, the executive is not so constrained (or, at 
least, has not yet been so constrained). 
But in substance, there is less to commend the distinction. Given that the executive has 
chosen to invoke the prerogative and thereby affect individuals’ legal positions, there is 
much to be said for imposing constraints on its exercise. A positive action invites scrutiny 
in a way that a failure to act does not. Indeed, the constraint of rationality applies (though 
the applicant lost on this point).85 
An additional possible constraint would be a prohibition on enacting a blanket policy. 
The same considerations that underpin the rule against fettering discretion in the context 
of a statutory power apply here with equal force: it is unfair to completely shut the door 
to individual circumstances; and from the point of view of good administration, 
submissions from individuals might highlight flaws in the policy.86 And doubtless, the 
individuals on the receiving (or non-receiving) end of the largesse do not care about its 
legal provenance. The distinction operates particularly unfairly in a case like Sandiford. 
Deciding to set out a blanket policy that, say, gives everyone the same amount of money 
or subjects everyone to the same criteria is quite different from deciding to set out a 
policy of blanket refusal. Not taking account of individual circumstances seems 
especially likely to lead to unfairness and poor administration in the latter case. In the 
former case, the executive can at least claim that everyone is better off. 
In summary, in the area of judicial review of exercises of the prerogative, the Crown 
again benefits from a special status. The “royal” source of the power exerts a significant 
influence on the nature of judicial control, with unfortunate results. Once more, no 
                                                           
hypothetically benefit by it. Such a right must arise, if at all, in other ways, usually by virtue of a 
legitimate expectation arising from the actual exercise of the power. 
84 See e.g. Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121 at 140, Rand J; R v Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, ex parte Padfield, [1968] AC 997 (HL). 
85 Sandiford, UKSC, supra note 77 at paras 67-73. 
86 See British Oxygen, supra note 79 at 625: 
[A] Ministry or large authority may have had to deal already with a multitude of similar 
applications and then they will almost certainly have evolved a policy so precise that it could well 
be called a rule. There can be no objection to that, provided the authority is always willing to listen 
to anyone with something new to say – of course I do not mean to say that there need be an oral 
hearing . . . . The respondent might at any time change his mind . . . . 
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normative basis is offered for the special status of the Crown, which is asserted, not 
explained and still less justified.87  
Remedies 
When one turns to remedies against the executive, the same pattern appears. The clearest 
recent Canadian manifestation is Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr (No 2).88 Here, the 
Supreme Court of Canada concluded that “the remedy sought” by Mr. Khadr was 
“precluded [in part] by the fact that it touches on the Crown prerogative power over 
foreign affairs.”89  
Mr. Khadr was a Canadian citizen detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the United 
States, after his capture in Afghanistan by American military forces. In earlier litigation, 
Mr. Khadr had successfully established that Canadian officials had violated the Charter 
by working with their American counterparts at Guantanamo Bay, in a process that the 
Supreme Court of the United States determined to be unlawful and which violated 
Canada’s international law obligations.90 He subsequently sought an order directing the 
Canadian government to seek his repatriation to Canada. At first instance, O’Reilly J. 
ordered the executive to “present a request to the United States for Mr. Khadr’s 
repatriation to Canada as soon as practicable.”91 A majority92 of the Federal Court of 
Appeal upheld the order as a reasonable exercise of remedial discretion.93 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that “Canada’s active participation in 
what was at the time an illegal regime has contributed and continues to contribute to Mr. 
Khadr’s current detention”94 and also accepted that there was a sufficient connection 
between the breach of Mr. Khadr’s rights and ordering the Canadian government to seek 
his transfer to Canada. However, “[a] connection between the remedy and the breach is 
not the only consideration.”95 In particular, “judicial review of the exercise of the 
prerogative power for constitutionality remains sensitive to the fact that the executive 
branch of government is responsible for decisions under this power, and that the 
                                                           
87 Compare Banfield & Flynn, supra note 60, who perceive judicial oversight as one accountability 
mechanism amongst many and welcome the reluctance of the courts to “impose substantive outcomes on 
the government,” trusting instead “that arbitrary action will be limited through the use of proper procedural 
processes” (ibid at 151). I have no objection to courts deferring to the executive when appropriate (see 
generally Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)) [Daly]; my target in this paper is the distinction between 
the Crown and other bodies. 
88 Khadr (No 2), supra note 44. 
89 Ibid at paras 27, 46. Para 27:(stating the question for resolution), and para 46: (invoking the prerogative 
as a justification for not granting the remedy sought).  
90 Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125. 
91 Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), [2010] 1 FCR 34 at para 92.  
92 Evans & Sharlow JJA, Nadon JA dissenting. 
93 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, [2010] 1 FCR 73. 
94 Khadr (No 2), supra note 44 at para 21. See also ibid at para 26. 
95 Ibid at para 33. 
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executive is better placed to make such decisions within a range of constitutional 
options.”96  
The remedy sought by Mr. Khadr gave “too little weight to the constitutional 
responsibility of the executive to make decisions on matters of foreign affairs in the 
context of complex and ever-changing circumstances, taking into account Canada’s 
broader national interests.”97 Accordingly, the better remedy was to declare that Mr. 
Khadr’s rights had been breached and “to leave it to the government to decide how best 
to respond to this judgment in light of current information, its responsibility for foreign 
affairs, and in conformity with the Charter.”98  
On one level, this analysis is unproblematic. Mandatory orders that compel the executive 
to act in a particular way should be a last resort, for separation of powers reasons;99 and 
courts should of course be cautious about interfering unduly in complex areas of 
policy.100 But these separation of powers reasons and institutional concerns have nothing 
to do with the prerogative; they relate to the “nature” of the powers, not their “source.”101 
The repeated references in Khadr (No 2) to the “prerogative” suggest that its presence 
weighed independently – and heavily – in the balance against according the remedy that 
Mr. Khadr sought. Had the Supreme Court of Canada mentioned only “complex and 
ever-changing circumstances,” and left it at that, its decision would have been more 
convincing; if prerogative is a synonym for policy,102 it would be better to use the latter 
phrase, which does not come encumbered with as much historical and metaphysical 
baggage. 
As it is, the invocation of the prerogative seems to be an attempt, rhetorically, to 
distinguish Khadr (No 2) from some of the Court’s other remedial decisions, with which 
it sits uneasily.103 Two decisions provide a particularly useful contrast, because they 
involved, respectively, a remedy requiring ongoing judicial supervision of government 
                                                           
96 Ibid at para 37. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting a comment made by Zinn J, when Mr. Khadr’s case 
returned to Federal Court after the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Canada proceedings: “In my view, 
if there is only one available remedy that potentially cures the breach of one person’s Charter rights, then 
that remedy must be ordered by the Court, even if the order involves the exercise of the royal prerogative.” 
Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), [2010] 4 FCR 36 at para 91.  
97 Khadr (No 2), supra note 44 at para 39.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Peter Cane, “The Constitutional Basis of Judicial Remedies in Public Law” in Peter Leyland & Terry 
Woods, eds, Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints & New Horizons (London: 
Blackstone, 1997), 
100 See e.g. Daly, supra note 87, ch 3.  
101 Council of Civil Service Unions, supra note 59 at 417, Lord Roskill. 
102 See e.g. Banfield and Flynn, supra note 60 at 149-50. 
103 Kent Roach, Canada’s leading scholar of constitutional remedies, has been particularly forthright in his 
criticism of Khadr (No 2): see e.g. “‘The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics’: The Afghan Detainee and 
Omar Khadr Cases” (2010), 28 NJCL 115 at 143-53; “Enforcement of the Charter – Subsections 24(1) and 
52(1)” (2013) 62 SCLR (2d) 473 at 483-84. 
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and a remedy compelling government to act in a particular way in a polycentric policy 
setting.  
Consider, first, Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education),104 where a trial 
judge who had found that the province had failed to respect constitutionally protected 
language rights retained jurisdiction over the province’s implementation of his detailed 
order. The majority of the Court considered that “the range of remedial orders available 
to courts in civil proceedings demonstrates that constitutional remedies involving some 
degree of ongoing supervision do not represent a radical break with the past practices of 
courts.”105 Ongoing judicial supervision was appropriate in the instant case, because there 
was no “suggestion . . . that the court would, for example, improperly take over the 
detailed management and co-ordination of the construction projects”; rather, its role of 
“[h]earing evidence and supervising cross-examinations” was “not beyond the normal 
capacities of courts.”106 This conclusion was sensitive to the fact that the trial judge “was 
crafting a fairly original remedy in order to provide flexibility to the executive” in 
respecting the Charter right at issue.107 It would not have been a great leap from Doucet-
Beaudreau to the remedy proposed by Mr. Khadr.108  
Consider, next, Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society.109 
Having reached the conclusion that the refusal to extend an exemption from the operation 
of federal drug laws to a supervised injection site was a breach of section 7 of the 
Charter,110 the Court took the view that a declaration would be “inadequate.”111 Rather, it 
granted “an order in the nature of mandamus,”112 compelling the minister to exercise his 
discretion in favour of granting a fresh exemption. Strikingly, its reasons for doing so 
could easily be transposed to Mr. Khadr’s case: 
The infringement at stake is serious; it threatens the health, indeed the lives, of the 
claimants and others like them. The grave consequences that might result from a 
lapse in the current constitutional exemption for Insite cannot be ignored. These 
                                                           
104 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3. 
105 Ibid at para 73. 
106 Ibid at para 74. 
107 Ibid at para 85.  
108 Indeed, when Mr. Khadr returned subsequently to Federal Court and successfully argued that Canada 
was still under an obligation to remedy the breach of his Charter rights, Zinn J ordered the executive to 
propose potential means of curing the breach and “reserve[d] the right[s] to oversee this explorative 
process, to amend the short time frame set out in the judgment for the steps that are to be taken, and . . . to 
impose a remedy if none is forthcoming from that process.” Khadr, supra note 96 at para 94. Zinn J’s order 
was stayed pending appeal. Blais CJ commented that the case raised “many serious issues” and found the 
retention of jurisdiction “surprising” in the circumstances: Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, [2012] 1 
FCR 396 at para 13. These matters were never fully addressed, however, because the case was ultimately 
declared to be moot: Canada v Khadr, 2011 FCA 92. 
109 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134. 
110 Ibid at paras 85-94, 126, 136. By, on the one hand, criminalizing the staff of the facility and, on the 
other, depriving users of life-protecting healthcare.  
111 Ibid at para 147. 
112 Ibid at para 150.  
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claimants would be cast back into the application process they have tried and 
failed at, and made to await the Minister’s decision based on a reconsideration of 
the same facts. Litigation might break out anew. A bare declaration is not an 
acceptable remedy in this case.113 
Here, moreover, the decision to grant the exemption was clearly a polycentric one, with 
effects on the health of drug users, the role of non-profit organizations and the duties of 
the provincial and municipal police forces. Protection of public health and safety is a 
complex issue, with high stakes. The principal difference between PHS and Khadr (No 2) 
would seem to be the presence of the prerogative in the latter and its absence in the 
former.  
Conclusion 
The special status of the Crown in Canadian administrative law has several important 
implications.  
First, the distinction between Crown powers and those exercised by statutory decision-
makers is important in Canada. In the different areas surveyed above, the source of a 
power rather than its nature puts an individual challenging government action at a 
significant disadvantage. From the perspective of the individual, this is troubling, because 
the outcome of a case could turn on the source – or characterization of the source – of a 
particular power, something quite remote from the merits of an individual’s case. 
Moreover, from the individual’s perspective, the source of the power used to modify her 
legal position is quite irrelevant; what matters is its nature and the effects of the resultant 
decision. 
Second, no normative basis is offered in these decisions for the different treatment 
accorded to the Crown and other bodies. The special status of the Crown is a legal fact in 
search of a normative justification. In the absence of such a judicially-offered 
justification, it would be better to remove the Crown’s special status from administrative 
law altogether. That the legislature has left a field open to the Crown to use its common 
law powers by failing to enact detailed statutory provisions is cold comfort to individuals 
disadvantaged by the exercise of such powers who would have had access to judicial 
redress had the powers been statutory in nature. 
Third, an end to special treatment for the Crown in administrative law could be 
accomplished by putting the Crown and statutory decision-makers on the same footing. 
As I have outlined, the benevolent approach to Crown powers could be extended to 
statutory decision-makers; the same rules could easily be made applicable to judicial 
review of exercises of prerogative powers as are already applicable to statutory powers; 
and there is no need for super-added caution when remedies for breaches of the law 
might have an effect on executive prerogatives.  
                                                           
113 Ibid at para 148.  
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Even with such incremental reforms to judicial review doctrine, the Crown would remain 
distinctive in Canadian law. It would remain the font of executive authority. Responsible 
government would continue to be a primordial principle of Canadian constitutional law. 
And so on. Putting the Crown and statutory decision-makers on the same footing in 
administrative law would bring coherence to the Canadian law of judicial review of 
administrative action without threatening the Crown’s distinctive position in the 
Canadian constitution.  
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